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Historical Origins of Environment Sustainability in the German Chemical Industry, 
1950s-1980s 
 
Abstract  
This working paper examines the growth of corporate environmentalism in the West 
German chemical industry between the 1950s and the 1980s. It focuses on two companies, 
Bayer and Henkel and traces the evolution of their environmental strategies in response to 
growing evidence of pollution and resulting political pressures. Although German business 
has  been  regarded  as  pioneering  corporate  environmentalism,  this  study  reveals  major 
commonalities between the German and American chemical industries until the 1970s, when 
the two German firms diverged from their American counterparts in using public relations 
strategies not only to contain fallout from criticism, but also as opportunities for changes in 
corporate culture. The working paper finds no evidence for variety of capitalism explanations 
why German firms should have been early in their sustainability strategies, partly because of 
the importance of regional as opposed to national influences, but the study is supportive of 
organizational  sociology  theories  which  have  identified  the  importance  of  visibility  in 
corporate green strategies. 
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The Origins of Environment Sustainability in the German Chemical Industry, 1950s-
1980s 
1 
 
         This working paper explores the evolution of environmental strategies in the German 
chemical  industry  between  the  1950s  and  the  1980s.  Historical  research  on  corporate 
environmental policies remains skewed. A vibrant environmental history literature has often 
identified business as a primary agent in environmental degradation, but it has usually not 
delved  deeper  into  corporate  strategies.  The  business  history  literature  has  only  recently 
engaged  with  the  topic  of  business  and  the  environment,
2  And  the history of corporate 
responsibility more generally.
3 This may reflect a disciplinary bias towards exploring issues 
related to innovation and growth, or else the failure to achieve them, rather than addressing 
negative outcomes of such innovation and growth. 
It  is  well -established  that  the  emerg ence  of  concerns  that  industrialization  and 
modernization were damaging the natural environment date back to the  nineteenth century.
4 
These concerns were driven by early ecologists, philosophers and scientists rather than 
business leaders, although by the late nineteenth century industrial pollution in major US 
cities such as Chicago and St. Louis was so evident that it encouraged a handful of business 
leaders to organize to persuade the business community to voluntarily seek ways to control 
such pollution.
5 During the era of German industrialization in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, conservationists also lamented the dangerous impact of chemical effluents 
on water and air.
6  However after 1914 the era of world wars, virulent n ationalism, and 
economic  crisis  did  not  provide  a  favourable  context  for  the  continued  growth  of 
environmental consciousness.
7 Environmentalism became, if anything, associated with right-
wing  political  extremism .  Historians were  distressed the discover that  the Nazi  regime 
introduced pioneering environmental legislation in Germany during the 1930s, although given 4 
 
the  other  policies  of  the  criminal  regime  claims  that  the  Nazi’s  were  “proto-Greens”  are 
clearly wholly misplaced.  
After the end of World War 2, attention was more focused on economic recovery, but 
the renewal of a more widely based environmental movement was propelled by a growing 
number of accidents and pollution incidents. There was a new articulation of environmental 
threats. Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring had a much-observed impact in raising awareness of 
the detrimental environmental impact of pesticides.
8 In 1972 the United Nations held the first 
Conference  on  the  Human  Environment  in  Stockho lm,  which  was  followed  by  a   new 
environmental legislation in Europe.
9 
Rising environmental concerns, and the legislation which it stimulated, had substantial 
consequences for businesses, and especially for those who were directly associated w ith 
activities deemed polluting. In post -war France, Boullet has described the emergence of 
environmental strategies in heavy industries, including chemicals, in response to regulation, 
ecological disasters and shifting public opinion.
10 The literature on the United States is larger. 
Hoffman, in a study of the chemical and petroleum industries, identified an evolution of 
corporate  strategies  over  time.  During  the  1960s  many  US  corporations  believed  that 
environmental concerns were exaggerated, and if there were problems, that they could handle 
them. In the wake of the 1970 Environmental Protection Act, there was a somewhat s ullen 
commitment to technical compliance with the law. During the 1980s, as environmental 
activism rose, US firms began to engage more pr oactively in establishing environmental 
rules.
11  
Hoffman’s  study  forms  part  of  a  wider  literature  on  the  history  of  environmental 
management and strategy in the post-war chemical industry, including studies by Colten and 
Skinner, Markowitz and Rosner, and Ross and Amter.
12 For the most part, these studies are 
critical of the industry’s claims to be following best practices during the post-war decades, 5 
 
and frequently criticise a gap between the public statements of firms and what they actually 
knew  about  pollution.  On  a  similar  line,  there  are  studies  by  Kehoe  and  by  McGucken, 
concerning the pollution caused by the discharge of detergents into lakes and rivers, although 
these authors also note the scientific uncertainties faced by policy makers and companies.
13 
These studies have  limited firm-level  analysis.  One  exception  is  Smith’s  survey  of  the 
environmental policies of DuPont, which is more positive about the company’s environmental 
strategies, and also stresses the uncertain toxicological knowledge on which decisions needed 
to be made.
14 In other industries and countries, firm-level studies have also pointed towards 
imperfect information as a constraint, as well as organizational deficiencies within the firms 
themselves.
15 
This working paper takes a firm and industry level perspectives, and focuses on post-
war Germany. The choice of country is deliberate. The German Federal Republic (hereafter 
West Germany) as a country has  often  been considered as a European pioneer in green 
policies. In 1979 the Green political party was founded in West Germany,  and became the 
first European Green party to make a major political impact in 1983, when it won 28 seats in 
the Bundestag (the West German parliament).
16 
German business has also been seen as a pioneer in addressing environmental issues. 
A  1995  study  assert ed  that  German  business  had  been  a  top  spender  ″for  a  cleaner 
environment…  since  the  early  1970s.″
17  However  it  is  not  clear  how  this  happened,  or 
whether it is really true, as there has been less historical research on green business strategies 
in West Germany compared to the United States. Most research has focused on the issue of 
industrial pollution primarily before 1945, and is heavily focussed on government policy.
18 
While business has been identified as a major polluter, firm strategies have not been discussed 
in  detail  in  recent  studies  of  the  evolution  of  environmental  policy,  including  Uekötter’s 6 
 
comparative study of German and American policies on air pollution before 1970. Uekötter 
mentions Bayer only once and Henkel not at all.
19 
The theory of why some firms become “greener” than others is still being developed. 
The  international  political  economy  literature  has  sought  explanations  in  the  varieties  of 
capitalism model. Mikler, in a comparative study of the automobile industry, has argued that 
firms in coordinated market economies, such as Germany and Japan, are more inclined to 
adopt  greener  strategies  than  their  counterparts  in  liberal  market  economies,  such  as  the 
United  States  and  Britain.  It  has  been  suggested  that  firms  in  such  coordinated  market 
economies operated with a framework of collaborative-consensus setting between business 
and government, that companies incorporated consumer attitudes rather than price signals in 
their strategies, and that soft topics counted more in internal corporate strategy.
20 
In the organizational sociology literature, there is also an emergent body of theory 
seeking  to  understand  why  some  firms  selectively  disclose  information  about  their 
environmental impacts, more colloquially known as greenwashing. This literature builds on 
earlier work which has  explored how an organization’s visibility affects  compliance with 
institutional  pressures.  There  is  evidence  that  greater  visibility  makes  organizations  more 
concerned with their legitimacy, although other research has suggested that the more powerful 
an  organization  the  more  it  can  afford  to  resist  pressures  from  external  stakeholders.
21 
Marquis  and  Toffel  have  employed  a  large-scale  comparative  sample  on  corporate 
environmental disclosure to distinguish between “generic visibility,” such as just being big 
and well-known, and “domain-specific visibility,” such as being identified specifically with 
an issue like worker safety, which exposes it to special scrutiny and is more likely to prompt 
more transparent disclosure.
22 
This working paper will examine the strategies of two prominent chemical companies, 
Bayer and Henkel to establish how far the assumption that post -war German business was 7 
 
greener than others, is supported. This question is comparative, and comparisons will be made 
with,  especially,  the  better-researched  American  case.  Bayer  and  Henkel  are  not 
“representative” of the German chemical  industry in  a formal sense, but  they do provide 
valuable  cases  to  test  hypotheses.  Both  companies  have  been  described,  and  have  self-
identified, as ″eco-pioneers.″
23 They differ in size, product markets and ownership structure, 
but  share  a  common  regional  base.  Both  companies  have  also  provided  access  to  their 
corporate  archives,  enabling  a  more  nuanced  understanding  of  corporate  motivations  and 
internal  organizational  issues.  After  having  found  supporting  evidence  that  these  German 
firms might have comparatively early in their environmental policies, the article will test how 
far the variety of capitalism and organizational sociology hypotheses discussed above are 
helpful as explanatory variables. 
Section 2 provides a brief history of Bayer and Henkel, identifying the similarities and 
differences  between  them.  Section  3  discusses  the  mounting  public  criticism  of  their 
environmental impact during the post-war decades. Section 4 analyses the corporate response 
to pollution criticisms before 1969. Section 5 examines corporate strategies during the 1970s, 
when a real divergence appears to happen between the German and US firms.  
Bayer and Henkel – History and Governance 
Bayer and Henkel shared many similarities as long-established members of the top-tier of the 
German chemical industry. They were founded in 1863 and 1876 respectively. Both were 
located in  the state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) near the river Rhine. Henkel was 
headquartered in Holthausen, in the south of Düsseldorf, after 1878, while Bayer settled in 
Leverkusen in 1900, where it made its head office twelve years later. Both companies became 
closely associated with their home regions.
24 At the turn of the twentieth century  Bayer was 
one of the top three chemical companies in the successful German chemical industry, and 8 
 
Henkel was the fourth largest. In 2013 Bayer and Henkel were also the second and fourth 
largest chemical companies in Germany.
25  
Yet the companies were not identical twins. While Henkel largely made consumer 
products, especially cleaning products, Bayer earned many of its profits through producer 
sales. While both companies were confronted with the environmental impact of their products 
and  processes,  Henkel’s  premier  position  in  detergents  exposed  it  to  one  of  the  most 
publicised issues of industrial pollution after 1945. Finally, while Bayer became a public 
company as early as 1881, Henkel remained a family firm. In 1975, Henkel changed its legal 
form  to  a  KGaA,  a  distinctive  German  corporate  form  which  was  a  hybrid  between  a 
partnership and a public corporation, and ten years later the company issued preference shares 
to the public, with no voting rights.
26 
The growth of both companies mirrored the history of modern Germany. Henkel was 
founded in 1876 by Fritz Henkel and two partners. Henkel’s first product was a universal 
detergent based on silicate. In contrast to similar products that at that time were sold loose, 
one of Henkel’s main innovations was to sell the heavy-duty detergent in handy packets. In 
1878, the company launched its first branded detergent, the Henkel's Bleich-Soda (Bleaching 
Soda). In 1907, Henkel introduced the laundry detergent Persil, a self-acting detergent which 
made rubbing and bleaching unnecessary.
27 After 1933, although individual members of the 
Henkel family were critical of the regime, most of the firm’s top managers joined the Nazi 
party  and  cooperated  with  the  authorities,  including  using  slave  labour.  After  the  end  of 
World War 2, five members of the family and another seven members of the Management 
Board and the Supervisory Board were interned by the Allies. They were rehabilitated in 
November 1947.
28 
Bayer was founded by dye salesman , Friedrich Bayer (1825-1880), and master dyer 
Johann Friedrich Weskott (1821 -1876) in 1863. The company made synthetic dyestuffs, 9 
 
whose production from coal-tar derivatives had only been invented a few years previously. 
Dyestuffs  were  sold  primarily  to  the  textile  industry,  which  was  growing  rapidly  during 
German industrialization. Bayer also diversified, especially into pharmaceuticals. In 1899, it 
developed and launched Aspirin, its most famous branded pharmaceutical product.
29 By 1914 
the company had many international subsidiaries, which were all lost as a result of the War. In 
1925 Bayer and the other German dye companies merged to f orm I.G. Farbenindustrie AG. 
During the Nazi era I.G. manufactured synthetic rubber and fuel, and infamously was the 
supplier for the gas chambers in concentration camps.
30 In 1945, the Allies confiscated I.G., 
and put two dozen of its managers on trial.
31 I.G. was broken up in 12 individual companies, 
one of these being Bayer. 
After  1945  German  big  business,  including  Bayer  an d  Henkel,  sought  to  rebuild 
reputations,  promoting  themselves  as  pillars  of  a  ″social  market  economy″  which  was 
conceived as an economically successful, but more humane, alternative to American-style 
capitalism.
32  Family-owned and managed companies such as H enkel were highlighted as 
exemplars of this German -style capitalism.
33  In fact, an emphasis on the broa der societal 
responsibilities of business was also prevalent in the United States and elsewhere. Spector has 
traced the roots of the modern Corporate Social Responsibility movement back to the Dean of 
the Harvard Business School, Donald K. David, during the late 1940 and 1950s.
34 
As major chemical manufacturers, Henkel and Bayer were important participants in 
West  Germany’s  post-war  ″economic  miracle.″  This  made  the  chemical  industry,  in  the 
language of sociology, highly visible. Table 1 provides data on the growth of the revenues, 
profits and employment of the two firms between 1950 and 1980. 
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Table 1: Revenues, Profits and Employment at Bayer and Henkel, 1950-1980 
  1950  1960  1970  1980  1950-1980 (%) 
Bayer   
Revenue (million D-Mark)  599  2,818  9,524  28,825   
CAGR (%)    16.7  12.9  11.7  13.64 
Profits (million D-Mark)  16  
          (1952) 
132  358  730   
CAGR (%)    23.49  10.49  7.39  13.44 
Number of employees             30,009              58,500             110,200            181,639   
CAGR (%)    6.90  6.54  5.12  6.12 
Henkel   
Revenue (million D-Mark)  248  677  1,820  6,899   
CAGR (%)    10.5  10.4  14.25  11.60 
Profits (million D-Mark)  8  n/a    54 (1974)  86   
CAGR(%)        4.76   
Number of employees  4,961  9,362                14,217              12,736   
CAGR (%)    6.56  4.27  (1.09)  3.19 
 
Sources: Bayer - BA Geschäftsberichte, 1951-1991; Henkel - Feldenkirchen, Menschen, 145 
and 186. 
 This  fast  growth  initially  reflected  recovery  from  the  wartime  nadir  rather  than 
profitability.  Cassis’s  comparative  study  of  the  profitability  of  large  German,  British  and 
French firms shows Bayer earning only a motley 4% return on shareholder funds between 
1953 and 1955. Like all the German companies, it was far behind its American counterparts in 11 
 
commercializing  products  from  petrochemicals.  However  even  Britain’s  largest  chemical 
company, ICI, only earned a 6.7% return. It is not possible to make a direct comparison with 
Henkel as the family firm did not disclose profits, but it is known that it badly lagged its 
American competitors, led by Procter & Gamble (hereafter P & G), in the new technology of 
synthetic  detergents.
35  Both  Bayer  and  Henkel  i nvested  heavily  to  rebuild  their 
competitiveness.  The  former gained entry into petrochemicals using joint ventures, and 
invested further in pharmaceuticals. Henkel fought off the entry of P & G into Germany 
during the 1960s, and by 1968 had almost 50 per c ent of the European detergent market.
36 
Between 1970 and 1972 Cassis shows Bayer’s return to shareholders as 9.5% and Henkel’s at 
9.7%, compared to ICI’s 9.5%. By this measure the two German companies were in Cassis’s 
ranking  of  the  eight  most  profitable  German  companies  at  that  time,  although  they  were 
significantly less profitable than the automobile companies Daimler-Benz (17.2%) and BMW 
(14.1%).
37 The oil price rises of 1973 were a more difficult time for chemical companies as 
indicated by Bayer’s slowing revenue and profit growth, and Henkel’s falling employment, 
shown in table 1. 
The Rise of Pollution as a Political Issue 
In the wake of the devastation caused by World War 2, environmental issues were not at the 
forefront of either political or corporate  agendas. Unlike in many American cities, where 
debates about air and water pollution were underway, German society was struggling with 
economic  reconstruction,  the  rebuilding  of  bombed  cities,  the  integration  of  millions  of 
displaced people, and the ethical collapse of Nazism. The chemical industry was hailed as a 
pillar of reconstruction, and a champion of Germany’s burgeoning export economy. Pollution 
was  accepted  as  a  necessary  evil.
38  However, as the economy recovered, environmental 
problems, especially air and water pollution, emerged in public discourses.
39 12 
 
Pollution was especially evident in the industrialized region of NRW. A report by 
independent experts in 1961 showed that there was heavy air and water pollution near the 
Henkel  and  Bayer  factories.
40  Local residents complained about unpleasant black smoke, 
carbon black particles, and bad odours. Residents living near the main Henkel factory wrote 
to the company complaining about increases in carbon black output, gas smells, and soot.
41 
During 1962 one resident repeatedly drove his car to the Henkel headquarters showing the 
black and white particles dirtying his Mercedes.
42 
Residents near the Bayer factory at Leverkusen also complained. In 1958 Bayer had 
installed a giant illuminated version of its logo, t he Bayer Cross, overlooking Leverkusen. It 
was the largest illuminated advertisement in the world, and might be c onsidered a symbol of 
“domain-specific  visibility.”  The  problem  was  that  it  shone  over  a  stinking  city.  Bayer 
received growing complaints about foul air, and especially the acidic effluents which stank, 
destroyed  garden  plants,  caused  headaches,  and  ruined  women’s  nylons.  Bayer  paid 
compensation  for  the  nylons,  but  officially  maintained  that  they  must  have  been  of  poor 
quality  to  be  affected  by  the  effluents.
43  In one official report initiated by the city of 
Düsseldorf covering the years 1958 to 1961, Bayer was directly accused of emitting too much 
ash and sulphur dioxides into the air, and requested to build taller chimneys with the idea that 
pushing the air high up in the atmosphere would help to thin out the pollution.
44 
The NRW was no stranger to bad smells. The traditional corporate response to 
complaints was to stress the importance of the industry.  During the early 1950s Henkel’s 
managers regularly stated that odour nuisances could not be further reduced, and that the 
neighbours would just have to live with them.
45 A decade later Bayer’s managers were still 
asserting in public that the discharged air was not harmful to humans, and that any nuisances 
should be accepted for the sake of employment and economic development.
46 The pollution 
just  got  worse.  In  the  mid -1960s,  a  phenomena  known  as  ″Auto-Pocken″  (″car-pox″) 13 
 
appeared near Bayer’s factories. Effluents caused severe paint damage on 7,000 cars. Bayer 
paid almost one million D-Mark in compensation (approximately £89,600).
47 The mysterious 
damage, whose cause could not be determined with certainty, had a distinctly negative impact 
on Bayer’s image in the neighbourhoods affected.
48 
Factory effluents in water were also a source of major concern. Between 1949 and 
1952 local authorities repeatedly warned Henkel not to release allegedly dangerous effluents 
into the public wastewater system. Bayer also faced an alarming number of dead fish close to 
its factory on the Rhine, which was attributed to a high level of Phenol released by Bayer.
49 
Water impureness became even more obvious in the hot and dry summer of 1959, 
when the water levels of rivers and lakes were exceptionally low. A significant amount of 
synthetic colours were detected in the Rhine. While it was not unusual to see a kaleidoscope 
of colours in the Rhine, the low water level made the effluents even more visible. The water 
police took samples and sent them to Bayer for further analysis. The lon g-standing relations 
between the local authorities and the firm was reflected in the fact that it was left to  the 
company to determine the cause for pollution because, as Bayer managers stated, ″they value 
our analytical competencies.″
50  
However it was foam on the Rhine rather than dead fish which really raised public 
concerns  in  the  NRW.  The  problem  stemmed  from  the  use  of  alkyl  benzene  sulphonate 
derived from cheap petrochemicals benzene and propylene, as the main cleaning agent in 
synthetic  detergents.  The  surfactants  did  not  bio-degrade,  accumulated  within  treatment 
plants, and entered rivers and lakes. By the late 1950s, a highly visible foam was found in 
rivers  and  lakes  across  Europe  and  the  United  States.
51  In Germany, as elsewhere, the 
detergents industry was soon identified as the culprit. In 1961, the popular national periodical 
Zeit, issued twice a month, ran a story with the title ″The water is sick. What to do with the 
scum of civilization?″
52 14 
 
Foamy rivers and car-pox began to erode the high status held by the chemical industry 
as a pillar of West Germany’s economic reconstruction. The industry was well-protected by 
the  post-war  legal  and  political  system.  The  German  legal  system  formally  prioritized 
economic  performance  over  the  protection  of  victims  of  pollution.  The  Gewerbeordnung 
(Prussian Industrial Code) of 1869/1900, still in force, stipulated that companies needed a 
license for new factories,  which could  be denied if the plant could  be expected to  cause 
unbearable risks or nuisances  for its neighbours, but for existing factories, the only legal 
recourse for residents affected by pollution was to engage in private law suits. There was no 
enthusiasm to disrupt the activities of national champions. In 1959, the Prussian Industrial 
Code was finally modified to strengthen the rights of residents living around factories to sue 
for financial compensation.
53 However, it was difficult to prove cause, and local authorities 
left it to companies to determine the cause of pollution.  
Critical voices struggled to get traction. In 1952 Sturm Kegel, the director of the Ruhr 
Area  Federation  for  Regional  Planning,  prese nted  a  detailed  plan  to  establish 
Luftreinhaltegenossenschaften (air pollution control cooperatives) in NRW, aimed at bringing 
together companies, local municipalities and regional planners to jointly implement measures 
against air pollution. Kegel’s concept was heavily criticized by public officials and industry 
representatives and eventually rejected, but it did prompt a debate and helped to raise the 
profile of air pollution as a political issue in NRW. On the federal level, an SPD member of 
parliament prepared a proposal for air pollution management for deliberation in the Bundestag 
in 1955. The professional association Verein Deutscher Ingenieure (Association of German 
Engineers), or VDI, volunteered to draft technical guidelines to monitor air pollution.
54 
Legislators remained cautious to move beyond monitoring. In NRW, the issue of 
water management was transferred from the Ministry of Economics to the Ministry of 
Agriculture  in  1953  to  assure  ecological  concerns  were  well -represented.  The  state 15 
 
government at the time was controlled by the conservative CDU party, which governed NRW 
between  1950  and  1956  and  again  between  1958  and  1966,  but  the  business  newspaper 
Handelsblatt criticised the move on the grounds that in such a heavily industrialized region 
the management of a key resource such as water ought to be in the hands of the Ministry of 
Economics.
55 There were no new restrictions on industry, but a 10 -year-plan to improve the 
water infrastructure and the building of treatment plants emerged. The NRW  government 
made over 75 million D-Mark (£6.75 million) available. The Bundestag also passed a Water 
Resources Act in 1957, which went into effect in 1960, initiating the building of new water 
treatment plants and other improvements of the water infrastructur e.  In 1962 the NRW’s 
Ministry of Agriculture stated that the measures had delivered few visible results, especially 
in the context of a growing population and rising industrial production. Waste water was still 
perceived to be a major a problem, and a further State Water Act was passed in 1962.
56 
Overall, these water management initiatives imposed few restrictions on industry, and were 
little more than devices to create structures for studying problems, much as was parallel 
legislation in the United States.
57 The exception was the detergent industry. The rising public 
outcry about detergent foam on rivers and lakes led to a Detergents Act being passed in 1961 
which legally mandated the use of at least 80 per cent biodegradable detergents from 1964 
onwards.
58  
During the federal election campaign in 1961, the candidate of the left -wing, Social 
Democratic Party (SPD), Willy Brandt, put forward a bold demand in a speech at the party 
convention: ″The sky above the Ruhr must become blue again.″
59 While this issue was not 
central to his speech, clean air was emerging as a topic which resonated with voters. Brandt 
lost the election, but the victorious CDU was alert to public discomfort, and its potential 
political  fallout.  The  Federal  Chancellor’s  office  under  Konrad  Adenauer  had  already 
proposed inquiries into environmental matters in the summer of 1960, ″with a view towards 16 
 
the coming elections.″
60 The influential weekly Spiegel echoed Brandt’s phrase in a title story 
about air pollution in NRW titled ″Toward blue skies.″ In eleven well-illustrated pages, the 
article described dirt-covered and dying plants, sick children, and automobile accidents due to 
the reduced visibility and roads made slippery by dust particles.
61 
There were no radical changes in either legislation or corporate policies after 1961. 
However, there was a new willingness on the part of the NRW regional authorities to push 
back when Bayer, Henkel and the other companies sought to acquire licenses for new 
factories. In their applications, the companies employed the concept of  Gewerbefreiheit 
(″freedom of occupation″) which included the freedom to practice any trade or craft and, 
closely connected to it, the freedom to take one's residence where one wished. Both Bayer and 
Henkel pleaded for their autonomy on these grounds when it came to locational decisions.
62 
Yet an increasingly concerned public informed by critical investigative journalists made their 
voices heard, and the willingness of local politicians to listen to them was discernible.
63  
Corporate Policies towards Pollution in the 1950s and 1960s 
Henkel  and  Bayer  managers  were  not  born  ″eco-pioneers.″  During  the  post-war  decades 
corporate policies towards the environment evolved slowly, grudgingly, and in response to 
mounting complaints.  
In  1958  Henkel  responded  to  criticisms  by  founding  a  Water  Pollution  Control 
Laboratory  to  monitor  water  pollution.  It  made  incremental  improvements  to  existing 
factories  to  curb  effluent  emissions,  and  helped  design  new  factories  with  better  water 
pollution controls.
64 The more substantive investment came in detergents. In response to the 
foam issue, Henkel began working on a biodegradable alternative to the cleaning agents in 
synthetic detergent after 1953. It had a product ready by the time the 1961 Detergents Act was 
passed.
65 This was not especially early in comparative terms. In the United States moun ting 17 
 
threats of legislation led the major detergents manufacturers to invest in alternatives. P & G 
made  a  substantial  research  investment,  and  in  1965  the  American  industry  voluntarily 
switched  to  use  a  new,  biodegradable  alternative.  Two  years  later  the  major  detergents 
manufacturers  in  Europe  also  concluded  a  voluntary  agreement  to  use  biodegradable 
surfactants.
66 
Bayer  also  began  to  reform  organizational  structures  to  raise  the  profile  of 
environmental issues. In 1954 Bayer turned its committees for clea n water and clean air, 
which  had  been  founded  fifty -three  years  previously,  into  an  Effluents  and  Waste  Air 
Laboratory (Abfaelle, Wasser, Luft, hereafter AWALU) designed to find solutions to deal with 
effluent pollution. The chemists and engineers working in the unit consulted with the different 
Bayer factories, and monitored and documented factory pollution.
67 In 1964, an independent 
Unit for Water Pollution Control and Emission Protection was established. By 1967, Bayer 
had also developed a plan  for air pollution control, which utilized television cameras for 
monitoring  visible effluents.  Three  young  employees  were  put  on  bicycles  to  look  for 
effluents on the ground, while a monitoring car checked for incidents just outside the Bayer 
plant. Effluents were also measured at the canals and the chimneys.
68 As at Henkel, the pace 
of organizational change and policy implementation can only be considered modest. 
Henkel and Bayer invested in waste cleaning facilities, but again at a leisurely pace. In 
1957,  Henkel completed its first central water purification system to process wastewater 
before releasing it into municipal sewage systems at the main Düsseldorf plant.
69 Bayer also 
invested in air and water purification facilities. Of the 56 air cleaning facilities Bayer operated 
in 1956, 37 were built after 1950.
70 There was further investment during the 1960s. Bayer’s 
investment  in  new  plants  and  improvements  to  existing  plants  to  enhance  environmental 
protection rose from 23 million D-Mark (£2 million) in 1963 to 91 million (£10.3 million) in 
1970.
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It was managers at the front line of environmental issues at the local level who most 
understood the need for change. In 1960, the AWALU unit at Bayer reported to a top manager 
that complaints about polluted air and related damages in neighbouring residential areas had 
increased alarmingly, and argued that it would no longer suffice to argue that environmental 
pollution was unavoidable.
72 Letters from local residents complaining about noise, smell, or 
smoke were received by Bayer and Henkel practically on a daily basis. At an internal meeting 
of Henkel’s senior managers in 1960, the problem was discussed in detail because ″it burdens 
(…) our relationship to our neighbours.″
73 It became standard procedure at both companies to 
respond to letters from local residents, sometimes with personal invitations to visit factories. 
However managers often struggled to make the case within their own organizations. The head 
of AWALU complained that the anti-pollution measures were not implemented effectively in 
factories due to resistance in the workplace.
74 Henkel also felt a need to educate staff about 
environmental  issues,  employing  the  house  journal  to  communicate  information  about 
pollution problems.  The company also regula rly diffused water  pollution laws to factory 
managers.
75 There was significant labour turnover at both firms, which made the challenge of 
educating staff on environmental issues a continuing one.
76 
Bayer and Henkel relied on industry and professional organizations as the first defence 
against critical press coverage. In the mid -1950s, the VDI, which was responsible for the 
setting of technical guidelines for air pollution control, set up a working group ″on publication 
issues″ with the aim of ″countering the public’s mistrust (…) through objective information, 
creating  a  sphere  of  trust  between  emitters  and  those  affected.″
77  The  German  Chemical 
Industry  Association,  an  industry  organization  which  represented  firms  in  contacts  with 
politicians, public authorities, other industries, and the media, pursued a similar strategy of 
seeking  to  deflect  criticism  by  showcasing  the  industry’s  efforts  to  deal  with  effluent 
problems.
78 It also continued to assert that pollution problems were a necessary price to pay 19 
 
given the industry’s regional and national importance.
79 The same argument continued to be 
used by the firms in  their public statements,  with  the added refinement  that further state 
regulation would handicap them in global markets.
80 
The two firms, and the German Chemical Industry Association, leveraged their long 
history of consultation and cooperation with local and regional officials as well as the federal 
government to seek to influence the con tent of regulation.
81 With regard to air pollution, 
Bayer explained to the local authorities in 1966 that nothing could be achieved without the 
cooperation  and  the  goodwill  of  the  industry.
82  Regulations  usually  evolved  slowly  in 
cooperation with the industry. The VDI’s guidelines for air pollution standards, for example, 
were initially merely nonbinding suggestions. Managers at Henkel and Bayer noted internally 
that the Federal government waited for such guidelines before setting legal standards for the 
industry.
83  
The interaction of firms, industry and professional associations, and policy -makers 
might  appear  to  fit  the  varieties  of  capitalism  description  of  post -war  West  Germany 
capitalism.
84 In fact, there were strong commonalities between what happened in  Germany 
and the United States during the 1950s and 1960s. The American chemical industry, like the 
German, asserted that it was essential for economic growth, and that pollution was the price to 
be paid. This would support the sociological research noted earlier that the more powerful an 
organization, the more it could resist external pressures. Both American and German firms 
responded to threat of regulations by arguing for more detailed studies of the problem, owing 
to scientific uncertainties. Like the G ermans, the American firms suggested that pollution 
incidents and complaints were a matter for local responses, tailored to specific settings, and 
considered  primarily  as  nuisances  rather  than  as  environmental  or  health  hazards.  US 
chemical companies relied just as much as their German counterparts on industry associations 
and corporatist-style negotiations with the national, regional and local government authorities 20 
 
who  held  discretion  over  administrative  responses  to  public  complaints  about  pollution.
85 
Uekötter has argued that the key difference between the US and Germany before 1970 was 
not that industry tried to lobby to shape regulation, but that Americans were more effective at 
it.  This was the case here, when, for example, the efforts by German manufa cturers  to 
influence the VDI Clean Air Commission met with little success.
86 
The near-consensus in the literature on the American industry is that this era saw 
unsatisfactory outcomes, including ineffective policies and  outright deceit by the chemical 
industry itself. Smith’s already-cited case study of Du Pont provides a rare exception with its 
argument that the industry did reasonably well in pursuing solutions to complex policies with 
conflicting scientific evidence, and in the absence of much interest by either legislators or the 
public.
87 The evidence on the German chemical industry seems to broadly support Smith’s 
argument  that  this  kind  of  policy  regime  could  achieve  some  positive  outcomes,  but  in 
retrospect  not  nearly  enough.  A  survey  by  the  Vereinigung  der  Grosskesselbesitzer 
(Association  of  High-Performance  Steam  Boiler  Owners)  showed  that  the  emission  of 
particulate matter in West Germany declined by 27 per cent from 1952 to 1962, even though 
production had increased by about 130 per cent over that decade.
88 Both Bayer and Henkel 
reported  reduced  pollution  loads.  Between  1958  and  1972  Bayer’s  emission  of  sulphur 
dioxide  declined  by  80  per  cent,  despite  a  considerable  increase  in  production.
89  Bayer’s 
management  reported  the  Leverkusen  plant’s  emissions  of  nitrogen  oxides  and  organic 
substances were “lower than the concentrations from the traffic on the nearby Autobahn.”
90 
The  achievements  appear  concrete,  but  also  bounded.  The  focus  was  on  visible  water 
pollution, dust and odour problems, while wider environmental issues received little attention.  
Among the most important of such issues was finding alternatives to active agents 
which  were  polluting.  Detergents  again  became  central  to  debates  as  it  emerged  that  the 
phosphate  compounds  used  as  builders  in  synthetic  detergents,  especially  sodium 21 
 
tripolyphosphate  (STPP),  were  contributing  to  eutrophication,  a  process  by  which  water 
became over-fertilized leading to an excessive growth of algae and other plant life. As more 
oxygen was consumed by growing and decomposing water vegetation, insufficient oxygen 
remained  for  fish  life.  Lakes  began  to  dry  up  and  die.  Although  eutrophication  occurred 
naturally,  the  process  usually  took  tens  of  thousands  of  years.  The  far  more  accelerated 
eutrophication that was observed in the 1960s appeared to be related to phosphate detergents, 
although the scientific evidence was not clear-cut.
91 
Henkel made an early research commitment to finding a workable substitute to the 
phosphorus issue. Konrad Henkel, who became chief executive in 1961 following the death of 
his elder brother, showed a new interest in engaging with environmental issues. The grandson 
of Henkel’s founder, he had been trained as a chemist, and worked as a researcher before 
joining the family business in 1948.
92 He established an Ecological Research Department in 
1964, which immediately started research on the effect of phosphates.  The company also 
began to measure phosphate loads in the Rh ine.
93  These steps were noticeably ahead of 
Henkel’s major European competitor Unilever, which continued to take a reactive approach to 
the phosphate issue, not committing fully to developing a viable phosphate substitute, and 
only shifting to low-phosphate formulas when legislation demanded it. In the United States, 
however,  P  &  G  also  initially  responded  as  energetically  as  Henkel  to  mounting  public 
criticism  by  undertaking  research  on  substitutes.  The  firm  developed  a  substitute, 
nitrolotriacetic acid (NTA), which it started using in 1966, and which became the preferred 
option of the Soap and Detergent Association until 1970, when it was discovered that NTA 
had health risks and was banned.
94 Thereafter the strategies of Henkel and P & G began to 
diverge. 
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During the 1970s Bayer and Henkel, like their American counterparts, encountered a more 
challenging environment as public opinion became more critical of the chemical industry, and 
there was a swathe of environmental protection legislation. West Germany emerged as one of 
the countries where environmental consciousness rose most sharply, but it was far from alone. 
There  was  a  growing  environmental  movement  in  the  United  States,  sparked  by  the 
publication of Silent Spring in 1962, and confirmed by the attention received by the first Earth 
Day on April 22, 1970.
95 
The  German  press  expressed  more  scepticism  about  big  business  and  its 
environmental impact than in the past. In October 1970, the influential national weekly 
Spiegel ran a title story on ″Gesellschaft und Umwelt″ (″Society and the Environment″) which 
publicly accused Bayer of polluting air and water. ″Sometime we really don’t know what 
more you could want Bayer to do″, proclaimed a Bayer advertisement quoted in the article. 
The article contrasted Bayer’s corporate attitude with data that showed that the amount of 
polluted water released by the company nearly equalled ″the effluents of a major town with 
2.5 million inhabitants.″
96 
Criticism was especially vocal at the state level. In November 1968, a CDU politician 
wrote to the NRW parliament demanding a discussion of the issue of air pollution and the 
health dangers associated with it.
97 In response, the state government publicly identified the 
chemical industry as the main cau se of air pollution problems. It promised to monitor 
pollution levels and inform the  public more closely.
98  In a letter addressed to Bayer, the 
regional Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs argued that ″because of the constantly growing 
nuisances through air pollution−particularly odour effluents−the Cologne region has moved to 
the centre of public interest and the interest of parliament.″
99 The state ministry moved to not 
only collect data about effluents, but publish them in the press, a strategy Bayer strongly 
opposed.
100  The  regional  Ministry  of  Labour  and  Social  Affairs  became  a  hotbed  of 
environmental concerns and actions, much to the discomfort of Bayer and Henkel.
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paralleled the situation in the United States where, during the early 1970s, it was municipal 
and state governments which took the lead in banning phosphate detergents.
102 
The NRW government also found new support at the Federal level. In 1969 Willy 
Brandt was finally elected Chancellor. In the name of his coalition government, which 
encompassed the SPD and the smaller Liberal Party (FDP), Brandt declared that ″the federal 
government  embraces  the  conviction  that  protection  of  nature,  and  of  natural  preserves, 
including  animals,  must  receive  more  attention.″
103  The  German  government  adopted  the 
principle of precaution (das Vorsorgeprinzip), rather than a specific standard of scientific 
proof, as the norm by which its environmental legislation would be guided. This was a radical 
move which few other governments followed. In Britain, for example, legislation tended to 
follow only on the basis of scientific evidence for environmental harm.
104  
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, an FDP politician who was appointed the Minister of the 
Interior,  embarked  on  new  environmental  legislation  which  extended  over  the  decade , 
covering issues ranging from aircraft noise and forestry conservation to the use of DDT 
pesticides.
105 He also created the Sachverständigenrat für Umweltfragen (Council of Experts 
for  Environmental  Questions),  an  academic  consultancy  body  advising  the  Bundestag  on 
questions of environmental policy. In 1974, shortly before he transitioned to being Foreign 
Minister,  he  created  the  Umweltbundesamt  (Federal  Environment  Agency),  a  Federal 
authority  on  environmental  matters,  which  provided  scientific  support  to  the  Federal 
government, oversaw implementation of environmental laws, and provided public information 
about environmental protection.
106 
This legislation reflected growing alarm about pollution. In 1970, one survey showed 
that 44 percent of the German public had stated that they would be willing to make personal 
sacrifices for environmental protection. By 1974, the number had increased to 70 percent.
107 
Another  survey  showed  that  the  chemical  industry  was  considered  a  major  culprit  of 24 
 
environmental damage. The more educated the respondent, the more critical they were of 
industry.
108 Environmental concerns spanned the political spectrum. In 1975 it was Herbert 
Gruhl, a CDU parliamentarian, who published a best-selling book entitled The Plundering of 
the Planet, which criticised unrestrained economic growth and the destruction of the eco-
system.
109 
The criticism of the chemical industry in particular was as virulent in the United States 
as in West Germany, and in both countries industry leaders considered it unfair. ″A climate of 
hysteria has been created, in which an objective discussion is not possible anymore″, reflected 
Konrad Henkel in a speech in 1971.
110 In an internal discussion he called the issue a ″witch 
hunt″ against the chemical industry.
111 In the United States, P & G executives considered the 
media criticism against phosphates “emotional, political, and, at times, quite irrational.”
112 
Despite the similarities, the strategies of the German and American companies began 
to diverge. In the United States, the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
in  1970  resulted  in  an  increasingly  stringent  regulatory  regime,  at  least  until  the  Reagan 
Administration  in  1981  sought  to  reverse  the  power  of  the  agency.  There  were  growing 
numbers  of  lawsuits  against  chemical  firms  from  environmental  activists,  and  strategies 
became  focused  on  regulatory  compliance.  The  chemical  companies  felt  defensive  and 
embattled, with the trade journal Chemical Week complaining of the anti-industry and anti-
technology views of critics in the media and elsewhere.
113 Public relations were employed as 
a strategy to, at best, portray the industry’s environmental efforts in their best possible light, 
and at worse to deliberately cover up known and harmful environmental impacts.
114 Greer and 
Bruno have argued that the strategies of denial, and lobbying, during the 1970s where the first 
stage  of  a  process  which  had  evolved  by  the  late  1980s  into  a  more  elaborate  “green 
washing,”  by  US  corporations,  which  involved  the  simultaneous  co-opting  of 
environmentalist rhetoric with strategies to weaken environmental standards.
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In contrast, in West Germany, the senior managements of Henkel and Bayer shifted to 
more  proactive  strategies.  During  the  mid-1960s  Henkel,  advised  by  the  American 
consultancy  Stanford  Research  Institute,  had  begun  to  invest  resources  in  enhancing  the 
public image of the company in general. In 1965 a campaign started to link the name of 
Henkel with cleanliness. Considerable emphasis began to be put on the firm’s long tradition in 
Germany, as well as its family ownership.
116 
In 1969, Friedrich Bohmert, the head of corporate public relations, started to  further 
reshape the firm’s communication strategies. Bohmert, who had worked as a journalist for the 
popular weekly magazine Hör zu, asserted that Henkel was an integral part of society, and 
that it needed to be open to the public and the press. He convinced his colleagues that the 
communication between company and society was an important task for senior management, 
and pleaded for a systematic, proactive and all-encompassing strategy. His policy was based 
on  the  principle  of  acting  instead  of  reacting,  and  informing  instead  of  denying  and 
defending.
117 In a new corporate image campaign run in 1972/73, Henkel emphasised its new 
motto  of  ″Industry  and  Society.″  Bohmert  was  awarded  one  of  the  most  prestigious 
professional prizes, the ″Goldene Brücke,″ for the campaign by the German Public Relations 
Society.
118 
Henkel redoubled its efforts to build an attractive  environmentalist corporate image 
after the earlier attempts had limited effect. In 1970 the management board already predicted 
that the pressures exerted by environmental groups would lead to legislation and regu lations 
that  ″may  threaten  the  survival  of  our  company.″
119  In  the  following  year,  the  company 
complemented  the  existing  corporate  identity  with  the  new  slogan  of  ″Henkel  for 
Environmentally  Friendly  Products  and  Operations.″  An  internal  Commission  for 
Environmental  Protection  was  created  in  1971  as  a  central  decision-making  body  on 
environmental  matters.  Peter  Berth,  who  held  a  chemistry  doctorate  and  had  worked  in 26 
 
research at the company since the 1950s, was appointed as chairman of the new unit, which 
was placed under the central management. It was entrusted with ″the setting of priorities for 
the work of carrying out the required defensive and offensive actions″ and with ″centralizing 
all internal company activities in this area.″
 120 
The intensity of the political and public criticism in Düsseldorf/Holthausen and NRW 
heightened environmentalist concerns within Henkel. The management decided to engage the 
local  community  more  directly.  In  November  1971,  residents  were  invited  to  join  the 
company’s managers for a ″dialogue with neighbours″ about environmental protection. Held 
on a Sunday at the main company headquarters in Holthausen, the event was led by Bohmert 
and intended to break ″the much criticized silence about environmental protection among 
industrial firms.″
121 A series of short films and presentations displayed Henkel’s efforts and 
plans to combat environmental pollution. The event met with both positive and more sceptical 
responses. Internally, Henkel’s management emphasized its hope that ″irrational fears″ about 
its activities would yield to reasonable discussions about intelligent solutions to problems.
122 
The event raised expectations which were not immediately met. As a result, when 
Henkel did not follow up with other public events, ten citizens from  the local neighbourhood 
took action in January 1974 with an initiative named ″Protect the environment from Henkel.″ 
By March, it had attracted such political momentum that an official meeting between activists 
and  representatives  from  every  political  party  was  held.  A  major  press  campaign  against 
Henkel was launched, and the activists demanded an environmental hearing by the Düsseldorf 
city government. The hearing was held in December. Henkel was obliged to defend its efforts 
to address pollution problems.
123 This prompted the company to engage in  further efforts at 
local outreach. These included the launch of Henkel Umwelt Blick, a magazine for the citizens 
of Düsseldorf and in particular for the neighbors of the Henkel plant, in which the company 
presented its latest research on environmental protection. It had a circulation of 50,000.
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The literature on the use of public relations in the American chemical industry, where 
it appears a prime example of selective disclosure on environmental matters, raises scepticism 
about the genuineness of Henkel’s emergent new “environmentally friendly” identity. Yet the 
internal records of the company suggest that top management did take environmental issues 
seriously. The head of corporate Research & Development and a member of the operating 
management, Dr. Arnold Heins, gave a copy of the 1972 Club of Rome report on The Limits 
to Growth to each participant at Henkel’s Technical Detergent Conference in 1972, and a 
special session was devoted to its discussion. This session identified the creation of the EPA 
in  the  United  States,  and  the  announcement  by  the  European  Council  of  the  European 
Conservation Year, in 1970 as events which had a strong effect on the public awareness of 
environmental problems in West Germany.
125  
Konrad Henkel also sent a strong signal both within and outside of the company about 
the direction it was taking on the environmental questions when he declared at a major 
industry event in Berlin in 1972 that ″we have all relied too much on the capacity of nature to 
regenerate itself. Stuck in our belief in progress, we have not paid enough attention to the 
undesirable  side  effects  of  progress.  This  must  change.″
126  Henkel  was  at  that  time  the 
chairman of the German Chemical Industry Association. When the senior management of the 
firm  met  at  the  end  of  1972,  Henkel  chaired  a  meeting  which  concluded  that  taking 
“environment  protection  issues  …  into  account  has  priority  over  opportunities  to  take 
advantage of short-term sales- and profits.″
127  
The company began self-identifying as an organization whose responsibility to protect 
the  environment  had  become  ″general″,  as  ″environmental  consciousness  has  become 
completely generalized and common in our society.″ The responsibility of companies, the 
management board concluded in 1973, had to extend to the protection of society as a whole 
on  ″the  widest  levels.″
128  The  senior  management  also  sought  to  engage  employees  in 
environmental issues. The company designed an environmental logo with voluntary input by 28 
 
more  than  400  employees,  and  regular  competitions  for  making  Henkel  greener  were 
instituted. The firm implemented a ″Environmental Consciousness″ plan (Umweltbewusstsein 
mit Aktionsplan) in 1974. On the management level, this plan received its own working group, 
which had a representative on the management board. 
Although  Henkel’s  initial  attempts  to  develop  more  effective  outreach  to  the 
environmentalist  community  stumbled,  the  firm  continued  to  seek  to  translate  their 
environmentalist  discourse  into  real  corporate  policies.  Following  the  example  set  by  the 
Federal government, and anticipating state regulation along the same lines, Henkel adopted 
the  principle  of  precaution  (Vorsorgeprinzip)  and  the  polluter  pays  principle 
(Verursacherprinzip)  in  its  definition  of  environmental  responsibility.  In  contrast,  the 
American  companies  at  this  time  were  still  devoted  to  the  tactic  of  keeping  products  on 
market, and emissions at current levels, while awaiting further studies or until mandated by 
regulators. Henkel adopted a ″principle of cooperation″ (Kooperationsprinzip), which Berth 
defined  as  ″trust-based  cooperation″  among  scientists  from  different  industries  and 
universities, and with other companies and government authorities on the domestic, regional, 
and international level.
129 A new Environmental Coordination Office was created to serve as 
the coordinating department. 
Berth’s new department took responsibility for the coordination of activities aimed at 
developing new products to substitute for raw materials perceived environmentally damaging. 
Henkel’s most pressing concern was to find a substitute for phosphates. In 1973, Henkel filed 
for an initial patent for the synthetic zeolite builder Sasil, an environment-friendly alternative 
to phosphates.
130 In the same year, Helmut Sihler, a  partner in Henkel and Chairman of the 
Central Board of Management, spoke publically about the trade -off raised for a firm by the 
issues  of  phosphates  –  the  tension  between  providing  consumers  with  a  product  using 29 
 
phosphates that they might prefer as a more effective detergent, and meeting wider societal 
needs by providing a zero-phosphate product which was better for the environment.
131 
Sihler’s  observation  was  made  within  the  context  of  a  global  view  of  the  issues. 
During regular visits to American and Japanese competitors, Henkel’s managers explored 
how companies dealt with environmental questions, and if these countries might develop into 
markets  for  their  new  zeolite  builder.  In  Japan,  the  visitors  noted the ″cleanliness  of  the 
Japanese people,″ but also the complete neglect of air and water pollution control. Henkel 
managers  observed  the  rising  attention  to  environmental  issues  in  the  United  States.
132 
Disasters outside Germany also continued to raise the profile of the  environmental issue for 
Henkel and other German firms. A major industrial accident in a chemical manufacturing 
plant in Seveso, north of Milan, in July 1976 triggered a new wave of public criticism of the 
chemical industry in Germany, and resulted in a widely circulated book entitled ″Seveso is 
everywhere,″ which identified, in the words of the subtitle, ″the deathly risks of the chemical 
industry.″
133 
The upshot was that although both Henkel and P & G shared an understanding that 
there was a trade-off between protecting the environment providing a zero phosphate product 
and meeting consumer demand for a maximally effective cleaning product, two corporate 
strategies now diverged. Henkel insisted that, on environmental grounds, a future of zero 
phosphate detergents was a desirable goal. P & G, which had filed a patent for a synthetic 
zeolite builder at the same time as Henkel, continued to downplay the role of detergents as a 
source  of  phosphate  in  the  natural  environment,  and  argued  that  reducing  or  eliminating 
phosphates in detergents would not effectively address the problem. P & G advocated the 
installation  of  municipal  so-called  tertiary  treatment  plants  as  preferable  to  removing 
phosphates from detergents.
134 Henkel argued against prioritizing the removal of phosphates 
through  tertiary  water  treatment,  and  inste ad  committed  to  more  research  until  a  zero 
phosphate detergent was found that prevented pollution.
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P & G continued to reformulate its brands with phosphate-free zeolite when it was 
obliged to, but otherwise employed phosphates, sometimes putting them back into brands 
when public pressure waned.
 It was
 only in 1993, after bans and restrictions on STPP had 
been  enacted  in  many  US  states  and  in  Canada,  that  P  &  G  permanently  abandoned 
phosphates in its North American brands. It continued to sell brands with phosphates in other 
markets.
136 In contrast, in 1983, Henkel’s first Zero P detergent, was launched under the brand 
Dixan, employing a mixture of zeolite with polycarboxylate. Henkel introduced a phosphate-
free ″green″ Persil in Austria, Netherlands and Switzerland two years later, and in 1986 Persil 
transitioned to a 100 per cent phosphate-free formulation in Germany.
137 These phosphate-
free brands preceded any legislation. In 1 988, the Germany detergents industry agreed on a 
voluntary total phosphate ban.
138 
Henkel further institutionalized its environmental corporate strategy under the name 
″Environment, Consumer Protection, and Safety″ in 1982.
139 Five years later, in the wake of 
going  public,  Henkel  published  a  set  of  ″Corporate  Guidelines″,  placing  ″environmental 
protection on the same level as the generation of profits as corporate objectives.″
140 Although 
Henkel  managers  might  have  initially  perceived  a  tension  between  consumer  desires  and 
helping the environment, by then it had become apparent that a green image was a way to add 
value  in  the  saturated  market  for  detergents.  During  the  1980s  managers  at  Henkel’s 
detergents  competitor Unilever expressed  annoyance that  Henkel,  as  well as  P & G, had 
achieved  greater  acclaim  for  being  ″green″  than  it  had,  even  though  their  products  and 
processes by then seemed not dissimilar in their environmental impact.
141 However it was 
noteworthy that Henkel pushed forward making only phosphate-free detergent at a time when 
both international competitors were, in some cases, reverting to the use of STPP. 
Bayer’s transition to a ″green giant″ paralleled that of Henkel, at least to some extent. 
The firm was far more diversified than Henkel, and was not a producer of a product like 31 
 
detergents which was a visible symbol of environmental concerns, yet it also felt pressured to 
respond to the increasing criticism by the NRW state government, the citizens of Leverkusen, 
and others. The staff of the AWALU unit was increased from 100 to 207 between 1969 and 
1971, and reached 480 in 1974.
142 AWALU stipulated in  that year in an internal document 
that  new  products  had  to  be  designed  as  to  meet  the  requirements  of  environmental 
protection.
143  
In 1974 Herbert Grünewald’s appointment as Chair of the Management Board resulted 
in  a  new  commitment  to  environmental  spending.  Grünewald  had  been  responsible  for 
Bayer’s human resources and social affairs before becoming Chair, and had formulated strong 
views on corporate social responsibility. On the environment, Grünewald’s views mirrored 
those of the American chemical industry in some respects. He publically complained about 
the negative impact on profits and employment of  government environmental legislation.
144 
He opined to journalists his view that his firm “could not win” in environmental matters, 
because Bayer’s enemies “would still throw dead fish from the river Elbe in front of our 
doors.”
145  However,  Grünewald  also  made  it  clear,  externally  and  internally,  that  correct 
environmental  policies  were  a  corporate  responsibility,  and  that  damage  control  was  not 
sufficient. “Regarding environmental damage,” he told Der Spiegel in 1977, “we do not just 
want to repair it, we want to avoid it from the outset.” In the same interview, Grünewald 
argued that environmental investments were an innovation opportunity for the firm. “When 
you  introduce  research  for  environmental  protection,”  he  noted,  “you  also  create  more 
value.”
146  This  was  an  early  articulation  of  the  now  widespread  phenomenon  which 
Dauvergne and Lister have described as “eco-business” – the use of sustainability strategies 
by large firms to make efficiency gains and enhance brand value.
147 In 1975 the AWALU was 
renamed Environmental Protection/AWALU, and the number of employees increased further 32 
 
reaching  675  in  1980.
148  As  Table  2  shows,  the  company’s  investments  environmental 
protection rose through the 1970s, although it fell back in the wake of the second oil crisis.
149 
Table 2: Bayer’s Investments in Plants for Environmental Protection 
  Investments in plants for environmental 
protection (in million D-Mark) 
Percentage of total 
investments (%) 
Cost of operation (in 
million D-Mark) 
Number of employees 
in AWALU 
1
1971 
65     150    
1
1972 
54     160   300 
1
1973 
74   11  173   350 
1
1974 
111   13  220   480 
1
1975 
99   14  250   500 
1
1976 
109   17  286    
 
1977 
121   18  322   552 
 
1978 
133   22  359   574 
1979  182   24  410   600 
1
1980 
165   18  485   675 
 
Sources: BAL Bayer AG Annual Reports 1971-1980. BAL Ingenieurverwaltung AWALU 
1973-1988, Jahresberichte der Abt LE Umweltschutz/AWALU. 33 
 
 Waste  water  management  was  a  central  focus.  A  decade  before  Grünewald’s 
appointment Bayer had launched a joint venture with the city of Leverkusen and the regional 
government to construct and operate a plant to treat both industrial effluents and domestic 
sewage. Begun in 1966, the first part of the project was completed in 1971. It employed state 
of the art technology, although both the noise and the odour generated complaints.
150 In 1971, 
Bayer also opened Europe’s largest industrial wastewater plant in Dormagen in cooperation 
with  its  German  joint  venture  with  BP,  Erdölchemie  GmbH.  In  1975,  another  huge 
wastewater plant in Uerdingen was opened.
151 Bayer received  an environmental protection 
prize from the Friedrich Flick Foundation in 1975 for the improvement of analysis equipment 
to monitor emissions.
152  
Among Bayer’s major innovations was the development of the Tower Biology facility 
in Leverkusen in 1979. This facility comprised four hundred feet high towers, and was the 
first of its kind allowing biological waste water treatment in a small area with little noise and 
odour, and using only one-quarter of the energy which previous systems had employed. The 
facility treated waste from both the Bayer factory and the city. The technology was employed 
at the same time in Bayer’s factory at Thane in Maharashhtra in India, and later adopted in 
other industries, including brewing.
153 Overall, in 1981, Bayer spent over two -thirds of its 
total investment in environmental protection on water cleaning facilities.
154 Company data 
showed  that  between  1977  and  1987  the  amount  of  heavy  metal  elements  in  Bayer’s 
wastewater fell by between 85 and 99 per cent, while pollutant emissions in the atmosphere 
declined by 80 per cent.
155 
Across  the  range  of  the  firm’s  businesses,  there  was  a  pattern  of  incremental 
investments. In 1963 Bayer had implemented a so-called double-contact process for a more 
efficient  and  environmentally  conscious  production  of  sulphuric  acid  used  for  mineral 
processing,  fertilizer  manufacturing,  oil  refining,  wastewater  processing,  and  chemical 
synthesis. The firm then invested in improving the process year after year, with momentum 34 
 
increasing over time. There were significant investments in improving this process over the 
following  two  decades.
156  There  was  similar  incremental  investments  in  improving  the 
environment performance of the Roskydal product line of unsaturated polyester resins, which 
especially after 1980 made the product odourless and ever- more environmentally friendly.
157 
While  Bayer  was  making  improvements  in  reducing  its  negative  environmental 
impact, there was also a new interest in building the firm’s green credentials in the corporate 
image.  ″Adequate  marketing  is  almost  as  important  as  an  environmentally  neutral 
production″, argued the head of AWALU in 1972.
158 Bayer introduced a new slogan ″Bayer 
researches  for  environmental  protection″  and  a  new  logo,  a  green  leaf,  during  that  year. 
Television advertisements informed the public about Bayer’s environmental protection using 
the new slogan and logo.
159 In an internal document in 1972, Bayer managers argued that it 
was necessary to engage in more  active marketing efforts to counter the ″industry-hostility″ 
that  made  conflicts  with  the  neighbours  more  severe  than  they  had  been  in  the  past.
160 
AWALU  selected a scientist for the environmental public relations who was the contact 
person for representatives of the media. The latter, members of the AWALU unit argued in 
1972, were increasingly scientists themselves, for whose inquiries Bayer needed an equally 
well-educated spokesperson.
161  
The concern to  bolster the firm’s positive environmental image extended below the 
senior management. In 1973 a representative of the workers council, Heinz Jacobi, suggested 
to the management board that Bayer should make a bigger effort showcasing its activities in 
environmental protection by organizing an exhibition, and in particular engaging with school 
children.  The  exhibition  indeed  took  place  in  June  1974,  and  included  the  head  of 
AWALU.
162 
In 1974, following Grünewald’s appointment as Chair, a sub-unit within AWALU was 
created  which  was  dedicated  to  public  relations.  It  organized  an  annual  press  conference 35 
 
concerning environmental protection with members of the management board as speakers, 
three to four smaller press conferences at the local level, as well as information and images 
for the press whenever necessary. The unit was meant to remain in constant contact with 
journalists ″to influence or even stop negative press regarding Bayer in critical situations”, as 
Dr. Meyer, the head of the sub-unit pointed out in an internal briefing.
163  
Bayer was already engaged in community outreach. It created a competition for school 
pupils and university students to engage them in questions of environmental protection. It 
offered ″open-door days″ for people interested in Bayer’s environmental activities and printed 
brochures with the title ″Bayer does more.″ The company also created an internal competition 
for  its  employees  to  choose  the  best  ideas  about  recycling  in  1972  −  an  event  that  one 
manager was sure would ″improve the Bayer image significantly.″
164 For its customers, it 
offered ″green consulting″ by informing them about the environmental impact of products and 
processes.  In  1973,  a  booklet  was  published  describing  60  environmentally-friendly 
procedures and products at Bayer.
165 
In  1976  Bayer  conducted  a  consumer  survey  on  the  chemical  industry  and 
environmental protection. Overall, 94 per cent of the respondents considered environmental 
protection important, while an impressive 61 per cent mentioned Bayer as one of the chemical 
companies making a positive contribution to environmental protection.
166 Bayer also received 
more positive press coverage over time. In a 1978 article, the national  Zeit called Bayer ″a 
green giant,″ noting its transformation after years of bad publicity.
167 Bayer invested heavily 
in communicating with the media. In 1980, it offered a seminar for journalists of regional and 
national  newspapers  with  the  title  ″Research,  Production  −  Safe  and  Environmentally 
Sound.″
168 While Henkel’s senior management, by the 1970s, was articulating strong views 
on environmental issues, and was prepared to move beyond regulatory compliance, as in the 
case of phosphates, Bayer more clearly fits the Dauvergne and Lister eco-business model. 36 
 
Grünewald clearly understood that sustainability could be a source of value and credibility for 
the firm. Bayer was not engaged in green washing – there were real environmental gains in 
reducing  the  harmful  effects  of  pollution  and  waste  –  and  it  was  engaged  like  its  US 
counterparts  in  trying  to  fight  environmental  regulation.  However  the  strategy  was 
fundamentally aimed at the “sustainability of big business, not sustainability of people and the 
planet.”
169 
Conclusions 
This  working  paper  has  traced  the  evolution  of  the  corporate  environmental  strategies  of 
Henkel and Bayer to post-war concerns about the environment. Both German firms have been 
called,  or  self-identified,  as  ″eco-pioneers″  and  ″green  giants.″  Their  strategies  appear  to 
contrast with most interpretations of the environmental strategies, or lack of them, of the 
American chemical industry at this time. 
It has been suggested that before the 1970s the environmental policies of Bayer and 
Henkel were not different, for better or worse, from their peers in the United States. Both 
firms were long-established polluters in an industrialized region notorious for stinking. The 
nature and timing of complaints about pollution in the two countries followed similar patterns. 
The chemical industry’s initial response in both cases was to argue that their enterprises were 
necessary  to  economic  progress,  that  pollution  was  the  price  to  be  paid,  and  that  more 
research  was  necessary.  In  both  countries  firms  relied  on  industry  associations  and 
corporatist-style negotiations with local, regional and national authorities. Especially in the 
specific  issue  of  detergent  phosphates  in  water  eutrophication,  state  and  municipal 
governments in both countries were the first to move away from this pattern toward more 
adversarial and stricter regulatory threats.  37 
 
During the 1970s, however, the two German firms really did start to invest more in 
environmentally  sustainable  products,  processes  and  strategies.  While  the  US  chemical 
industry remained defensive and focused on legal compliance, there was a greater proactivity 
among  the  German  firms.  The  managements,  Henkel  in  particular,  moved  beyond  the 
technical compliance seen in the United States, and both firms launched assertive, proactive 
campaigns to build images as ″green giants.″ While American firms often employed public 
relations to divert attention from problems, or even to mislead, Bayer and Henkel used fallout 
from criticism as opportunities for changes in corporate culture aimed at a positive bond with 
consumers based on new “green” brand identities. During the 1970s Bayer’s management 
articulated  views  that  sustainability  could  result  in  real  commercial  benefits  to  the  firm, 
similar to recent descriptions of “eco-business” strategies. 
The working paper  has examined why German strategies diverged from those seen in 
the United States. It has found little support for explanations resting on alleged differences 
between  German  and  American  models  of  capitalism.  However  other  home  country 
influences  are  discernible.  In  Germany,  Henkel  and  Bayer  were  initially  spared  criticism 
because of their perceived importance in rebuilding the shattered German economy, but by 
the 1970s there were rising environmental concerns across a wide section of  the German 
population, as evidenced by the election of Green Party representatives to the Bundestag in 
1983. There were significant environmental activist movements in the United States also, but 
they were not powerful enough to win many public offices. During the early 1980s, as the 
Green Party entered the Bundestag, the Reagan administration was trying to emasculate the 
EPA.  
However,  this  was  at  least  as  much  of  a  regional  story  than  a  national  one.  The 
significant regulatory, political and other differences in many countries, perhaps especially 
Germany and the United States, are regularly ignored in the variety of capitalism literature, 38 
 
including  Mikler’s  study  of  the  greening  of  the  automobile  industry.  Yet  the  regional 
embeddedness  of  Bayer  and  Henkel  in  NRW  emerges  as  an  important  determinant  for 
investments in green products and processes. The firms had deep reputational stakes invested 
in their region. This sharpened the impact of protests held outside their head offices, and local 
politicians criticising and legislating about pollution. The reputation of Henkel, a family firm 
held to embody the strength of German capitalism, and which had invested in a corporate 
image  associated  with  cleanliness,  was  highly  vulnerable  to  local  residents  and  the  local 
government blaming it for foamy rivers and bad smells. The reputation of Bayer, the pride of 
the  German  chemical  industry,  manufacturer  of  aspirin  and  whose  logo  illuminated 
Leverkusen, was equally vulnerable to being accused of creating “car-pox” and killing fish. 
Initially this “domain-specific visibility” did not result in a marked divergence from strategies 
seen elsewhere, but its effect appears to have been both real and cumulative. By the 1970s, 
and after the Federal government had also become engaged in environmental issues, a new 
generation of corporate leaders such as Konrad Henkel, Herbert Grünewald and Friedrich 
Bohmert  had  concluded  that  more  reactive  strategies  were  needed  to  fulfil  societal 
expectations.  They  were  savvy  enough  to  understand  that  investing  in  environmental 
sustainability  could  provide  an  opportunity  to  create  value  for  the  firm,  and  that  self-
identifying as eco-pioneers had commercial as well as reputational benefits, provided that the 
image reflected genuine policies and processes. 
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